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Statement on
“Bringing Justice Closer to the People: Examining Ideas for
Restructuring the Ninth Circuit”
Arthur D. Hellman
Abstract
Congress is once again considering legislation to divide the largest of the federal
judicial circuits, the Ninth. On March 16, 2017, a subcommittee of the House Judiciary
Committee held a hearing on “Bringing Justice Closer to the People: Examining Ideas for
Restructuring the Ninth Circuit.” This statement was submitted for the record of the
hearing.
The statement addresses three questions. First, what considerations should
Congress take into account in determining whether to restructure the Ninth Circuit?
Second, if restructuring is desirable, how should the legislation be drafted? Third, how
do pending House bills measure up?
The burden is on those who would alter an existing structure to show that the
structure is seriously deficient and that their particular proposal would be an
improvement on the status quo. On the evidence now available, the proponents of
dividing the Ninth Circuit have not met their burden. But the arguments made by
opponents of the split are not very compelling either.
In considering whether to divide the present Ninth Circuit into two new circuits,
Congress may want to look separately at the likely consequences for the circuit that
includes California and for the circuit that does not. If circuit division would benefit the
legal communities and the citizenry in the states of the proposed new non-California
circuit, and the division can be accomplished without disadvantaging the circuit that
includes California, that might be enough to justify the reorganization.
If Congress follows that approach, the legislation should be carefully drafted to
avoid the flaws that made prior proposals so injurious, particularly to the circuit that
would include California. In particular, each of the new circuits should be composed of
at least three states. And the legislation should allocate to the new Ninth Circuit a
sufficient number of judgeships to assure that the per-judge caseload in that circuit
would be no greater than it is today, and preferably smaller.
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Executive Summary
1. The burden is on those who would alter an existing structure to show
that the structure is seriously deficient and that their particular proposal would
be an improvement on the status quo. On the evidence now available, the
proponents of dividing the Ninth Circuit have not met their burden.
2. In the past, Congress has declined to divide a circuit until it received a
strong signal from the legal community in the affected region that the existing
circuit was too large. That is sound policy, because the judges and lawyers of the
circuit are in the best position to know whether the circuit is malfunctioning.
3. Proponents of circuit reorganization invoke numbers and statistics, but
some are not probative at all and others fail to show that circuit size is the
determining factor. However, one numbers-based argument cannot be easily
dismissed: for more than 25 years, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
consistently ranked at or near the bottom among federal appellate courts in the
median time interval from filing the notice of appeal to final disposition. But the
connection between delay and circuit size has not been shown.
4. Although the arguments made by proponents of a circuit split are not
persuasive, the arguments made by opponents are not very compelling either.
For example, concerns that the two circuits will go their separate ways on issues
of federal law are overstated; empirical studies show that conflicts between
circuits generally do not present a serious problem in the legal system.
5. In considering whether to divide the present Ninth Circuit into two new
circuits, Congress may want to look separately at the likely consequences for the
circuit that includes California and for the circuit that does not. If circuit division
would benefit the legal communities and the citizenry in the states of the
proposed new non-California circuit, and the division can be accomplished
without disadvantaging the circuit that includes California, that might be enough
to justify the reorganization.
6. If Congress follows that approach, the legislation should be carefully
drafted to avoid the flaws that made prior proposals so injurious, particularly to
the circuit that would include California. In particular, each of the new circuits
should be composed of at least three states. And the legislation should allocate to
the new Ninth Circuit a sufficient number of judgeships to assure that the perjudge caseload in that circuit would be no greater than it is today, and preferably
smaller.
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Statement of
Arthur D. Hellman
Chairman Issa, Vice Chairman Collins, Ranking Member Nadler, and Members of
the Subcommittee:
I appreciate this opportunity to express my views on the topic of this
hearing, “Bringing Justice Closer to the People: Examining Ideas for Restructuring
the Ninth Circuit.”
In my view, Congress should proceed with great caution before
restructuring the Ninth Circuit (or indeed any of the federal judicial circuits). The
burden is on those who would alter the existing structure to show that the
structure is seriously deficient and that their particular proposal would, on
balance, improve the administration of justice in the circuit and in the federal
judicial system as a whole.
On the evidence now available, I do not think the proponents of dividing
the Ninth Circuit have met their burden. But if Congress concludes otherwise, it
should restructure the circuit in a way that brings justice “closer to the people”
by respecting the relationships and arrangements that the people of the nine
states in the circuit have developed voluntarily over the years.
In this statement I discuss some of the principles that should guide Congress
and this Subcommittee in assessing current and future proposals for circuit
reorganization. The statement is in four parts. Part I addresses the question: what
considerations should Congress take into account in determining whether to
restructure the Ninth Circuit? Part II discusses the criteria for evaluating
particular proposals. Part III briefly examines pending bills in light of these
guidelines. Part IV is a brief conclusion.
Before turning to these matters, I will say a few words by way of personal
background. I am a professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law, where I have taught since 1975; in 2005 I was appointed as the inaugural
holder of the Sally Ann Semenko Endowed Chair. I have been studying the Ninth
Circuit for more than 40 years. In the mid-1970s, I served as Deputy Director of
the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System (Hruska
Commission) and helped to write its report recommending division of the Ninth
Circuit. (As I explained in response to a question from the late Chairman of this
Subcommittee, Rep. Howard Coble, at a hearing in 1999, I believe that the
Hruska Commission recommendation was well-supported at the time, but that
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subsequent developments have completely undercut the premises on which the
Commission relied.)
In the late 1980s I supervised a group of distinguished legal scholars and
political scientists in analyzing the innovations of the Ninth Circuit and its court
of appeals.1 From 1999 through 2001, I served on the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals Evaluation Committee appointed by Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr. The 10person Committee studied every aspect of the operations of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, with particular attention to issues identified by the
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (White
Commission). I have also worked for the Ninth Circuit; in the late 1970s I served
as Director of the Central Legal Staff of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In
this statement I speak only for myself; I do not speak for the court or any other
institution.
I. Is There a Need for Restructuring?
The purpose of this hearing is to examine ideas for restructuring the Ninth
Circuit. The first question is: is there a need to restructure the circuit at all? I
therefore begin by outlining some of the general principles that should guide
Congress in making that determination.
1. Congress should not reorganize a federal court out of displeasure with
the decisions of its judges.
In the past, some proponents of a circuit split have openly acknowledged
that they were motivated by disagreement with decisions of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. That is contrary to the principle that was established in
American political life 80 years ago when President Roosevelt’s plan to “pack”
the Supreme Court went down to defeat, in large part because it was rejected by
members of his own political party. As the White Commission said, “There is
one principle that we regard as undebatable: It is wrong to realign circuits (or not
to realign them) and to restructure courts (or to leave them alone) because of
particular judicial decisions or particular judges. This rule must be faithfully

1

The fruits of our research were published in Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the
Ninth Circuit and the Future of the Federal Courts (Cornell University Press 1990).
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honored, for the independence of the judiciary is of constitutional dimension and
requires no less.”2
2. The burden is on those who would alter an existing structure to show that
problems exist, that the proposed alteration offers a fair prospect of ameliorating
the problems, and that the legislation would not create serious new problems.
No institution is immune from criticism, and change should not be opposed
simply because it is change. But change inevitably exacts costs. More important,
we can never fully foresee the consequences of replacing one set of institutional
arrangements with another. There is always a risk that the cure will be worse
than the disease. It is therefore appropriate to put the burden of persuasion on
those who seek change.
How heavy should the burden be? Two decades ago, the Judicial
Conference of the United States suggested that the burden should be very heavy
indeed. It said: “Circuit restructuring should occur only if compelling empirical
evidence demonstrates adjudicative or administrative dysfunction in a court so
that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent circuit
law in the face of increasing workload.”3
As a practical matter, this standard is impossible to meet, and I would not
adopt it. Instead, I suggest this: Congress should not restructure a circuit unless
there is substantial evidence indicating that the circuit – and the federal judicial
system as a whole – will be better off with a particular reorganization than with
the status quo or other possible courses of action. The burden remains on the
proponents of change. The focus must be on the benefits and drawbacks of a
particular reorganization plan. Congress does not legislate in the abstract;
benefits and drawbacks cannot be assessed in the abstract.
3. In considering proposals to divide the Ninth Circuit, Congress should be
guided by its handling of similar proposals in the past. In particular, it should give
substantial weight to the views of the judges and lawyers in the affected region.
Twice in the 126-year history of the federal courts of appeals, Congress has
divided one of the judicial circuits. In each instance, Congress waited until the

2

Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final Report 6
(1998) [hereinafter White Commission Report]. The Commission was chaired by the late
Justice Byron R. White.
3

Judicial Conference of the United States, Long Range Plan of the Federal Courts 44
(1995).
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legal community in the affected region had reached a consensus that division was
warranted.4
The first circuit split occurred in 1929, when Congress carved out the
Tenth Circuit from the old Eighth. Initially the idea was controversial. But by the
time hearings were held on the circuit division proposal, all of the judges of the
existing Eighth Circuit and bar associations of eight states had expressed their
approval.
Of greater contemporary relevance is the history of the division of the old
Fifth Circuit. The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
(Hruska Commission) recommended division of the Fifth Circuit in 1973. A bill to
implement the recommendation was introduced in Congress within months of
the Commission’s report. But the legislation was not enacted at that time, or for
several years thereafter. One of the main reasons was that the proposed division
was strongly opposed by some members of the court, as well as by some
lawyers’ groups. By 1980, however, professional opinion had turned around. The
judges of the court unanimously petitioned Congress to divide the circuit. Bar
associations in each of the six states and others in the legal community agreed.
Only then did Congress act.
I am not suggesting that Congress should wait until professional opinion is
unanimous or even overwhelming in support of a split. But history tells us that
Congress has stayed its hand until it received a strong signal from the legal
community in the affected region that the existing circuit was too large.
I recognize, of course, that the structure and organization of the federal
courts are matters that the Constitution commits to Congress. Indeed, some
Ninth Circuit judges have declined to take a position on circuit reorganization
proposals for that very reason. Nevertheless, as a matter of comity – the respect
due to an equal branch of government – it is appropriate and sensible for
Congress to defer action until the proposed reorganization has substantial
support from the judges and lawyers in the affected region.
That is good policy as well. If the arguments in favor of a split have not
persuaded those who would be most directly affected by any inadequacies in the
existing structure, it is hard to see why Congress should conclude otherwise.

4

For a brief account of the history summarized here, with additional citations, see Arthur
D. Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57 Montana L. Rev.
261, 268-70 (1996) [hereinafter Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit].
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But comity is a two-way street. If Congress is to give such heavy weight to
the views of the judges and lawyers in the circuit, it must have confidence in the
process by which those views have been reached. This means that the judges and
lawyers – particularly the judges – have an obligation to give a fair and thorough
hearing to reasonable new legislative proposals, even if they have previously
taken the position that no change is warranted.
4. Congress should be very wary of drawing conclusions based on statistics
about the performance of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. It should ask
whether the numbers truly demonstrate the existence of problems; and if the
Ninth Circuit does come off badly, Congress should insist on evidence showing that
the problems can be linked to circuit size.
Proponents of dividing the Ninth Circuit make extensive of numbers and
statistics. For example, we are told that: the Ninth Circuit covers 20% of the
United States population. The court of appeals has an 80% reversal rate. The
average wait time for decisions exceeds 15 months. And so forth.
I have written extensively about some of these issues, and I will not repeat
that discussion here.5 But three points are worth making.
First, some of the numbers are not probative at all. Yes, the Ninth Circuit
covers a vast territory and includes a large population. But size, of itself, cannot
be an argument for restructuring. Alaska is larger than the combined area of the
22 smallest U.S. states, but no one thinks that Alaska should be restructured.
One out of every eight U.S. residents lives in California, but few people take
seriously the occasional suggestion that California should be divided into two
states. The question for Congress is whether the Ninth Circuit’s size has
impeded its ability to carry out its functions in the American legal system. Mere
recitation of large numbers cannot answer that question.
Second, some of the statistics are open to debate. For example, proponents
argue that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed by the Supreme Court
far more often than other circuits. But there is much disagreement among
scholars and other commentators about how to measure the various circuits’
reversal rates.6 And even if it could be established that the Ninth Circuit is
indeed “the most reversed,” it would still be necessary to show that the reversal
5

See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Banc Process in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 425 (2000).
6

See, e.g., John S. Summers and Michael J. Newman, Towards a Better Measure and
Understanding of U.S. Supreme Court Review of Courts of Appeals Decisions, 80 U.S.L.W. 393 (2011).
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rate is a consequence of the court’s size. I investigated this point some years ago,
and after careful empirical analysis I was not able to substantiate a causal
connection between the court’s size and the pattern of reversals.7
In making their argument, proponents of circuit division often fail to note
that size is not the only characteristic that makes the Ninth Circuit unique among
the federal courts of appeals. Uninterruptedly for the last 20 years, the Ninth
Circuit – and only the Ninth Circuit – has had a majority of active judges who
were appointed by Democratic Presidents. During that same period, the
Supreme Court has had a majority of Justices who were appointed by Republican
Presidents. Numerous studies have shown a strong correlation between the
political party of the appointing President and a judge’s liberal or conservative
voting. Based on these studies, it is much easier to conclude that the Ninth
Circuit’s high reversal rate is a consequence of the ideological difference between
the two courts than it is to attribute the reversal rate to the Ninth Circuit’s size.8
Third, there is one numbers-based argument that cannot be readily
dismissed. Proponents of reorganization assert that the Ninth Circuit’s size
results in delays in the disposition of cases. They can point out that for more than
25 years, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently ranked at or near
the bottom among federal appellate courts in the median time interval from filing
the notice of appeal to final disposition.9 Moreover, this phenomenon has
7

See Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit, supra note 5, at 431-52.

8

Ten years ago, Professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick argued that “it can be shown mathematically
that, as a court grows larger, it is increasingly likely to issue extreme decisions” that would be
candidates for reversal by the Supreme Court. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Op-Ed, Disorder in the Court:
The 9th Circuit is Overturned More than any Other Appeals Court. Its Size May Be a Factor, L.A.
Times, July 11, 2007 at A15. Professor David H. Kaye, co-author of a leading reference work on
statistics, reviewed Professor Fitzpatrick’s analysis. He agreed that the mathematics in the op-ed
“has some bearing on the optimal size of appellate courts.” But he concluded that “the effort to
link circuit court size with Supreme Court overrulings seems strained, and the putative link is
not a compelling basis for dividing the Ninth Circuit.” D.H. Kaye, On a Mathematical Argument for
Splitting the Ninth Circuit, 48 Jurimetrics J. 329 (2008).
9

Here is the ranking of the Ninth Circuit for the last ten years (12th is slowest):
2016 ............................. 12
2015 ............................. 12
2014 ............................. 11
2013 ............................. 12
2012 ............................. 12
2011 ............................. 12
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persisted even in years when the court has had virtually its full complement of
active judges.
To be sure, there is also contrary evidence: if one considers only the time
that the cases are in the hands of the judges (that is, from submission to final
order), the circuit is among the fastest. But that is little consolation to the
litigants whose cases linger in the pipeline.
On balance, this record does suggest a problem, even a problem of some
magnitude. But is the problem related to the size of the circuit? That is a much
more difficult question. In 2003, I tried to shed light on that point by compiling a
table that listed the three slowest circuits for each year from 1980 through 2002.
Analysis of the patterns suggested that in most of the courts of appeals, delay was
the product of transient circumstances. When circumstances changed, the circuit
went off the list. But in the Ninth Circuit, delay appeared to be chronic and
persistent. And the ensuing years have not brought improvement.
These findings do lend support to the argument. But correlation does not
prove causation. And in the absence of a well-grounded theory that would
explain why delay is a consequence of the court’s size, it is impossible to
conclude that splitting the circuit would provide a cure. One might speculate, for
example, that the many manifestations of circuit size – number of cases, number
of circuit judges, number of districts, number of trial judges, etc. – somehow
combine to produce a complexity that defies even the most skillful and
determined management efforts. But speculation – even plausible speculation – is
not enough.
Moreover, there is another possible explanation for the pattern of delays:
even with 29 authorized judgeships, the court may not have enough judges. In
fact, the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that
Congress create five new permanent judgeships for the Ninth Circuit Court of

2010 ............................. 12
2009 ............................. 12
2008 ............................. 12
2007 ............................. 12
The rankings are limited to cases terminated on the merits. The data are taken from Table B-4
for 12-month periods ending September 30 in the “Judicial Business” series posted on the
website of the Federal Judiciary by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.
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Appeals.10 The Conference has not recommended new appellate judgeships for
any of the other circuits. Arguably it would make sense for Congress to first
provide the judges to help the court dispose of its backlog, and to split the circuit
later only if the additional judgepower does not enable the court to speed up its
pace of disposition. The drawback is that if size does contribute to the pattern of
delay, adding judges to the existing circuit could make the situation even worse.
From this perspective, splitting the circuit in accordance with the principles
suggested in Part II of this statement could actually be the less risky course of
action.
5. In considering whether to divide the present Ninth Circuit into two new
circuits, Congress may want to look separately at the likely consequences for the
circuit that includes California and for the circuit that does not.
More than 40 years ago, the Hruska Commission recommended division of
both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits. As already noted, less than a decade after
the Commission issued its report, the Fifth Circuit was divided in accordance
with the Commission’s recommendation. But the Ninth Circuit remains intact,
and the controversy over restructuring continues unabated, as is evidenced by
this hearing.
One reason the histories diverged is that the old Fifth Circuit consisted of
six states that could be divided into two three-state circuits with (at that time)
roughly equal caseloads. For the Ninth Circuit, no such division is possible.
California now accounts for more than half of the appeals from the district courts
of the circuit, and the circuit that includes California will be a very large circuit no
matter what other states are contained within it.11
There is, however, another way of looking at this seemingly intractable
obstacle. If circuit division would benefit the legal communities and the citizenry
in the states of the proposed new non-California circuit, and the division can be
accomplished without disadvantaging the circuit that includes California, that
might be enough to justify the reorganization. To put it another way: If the
California circuit (which I’ll call the new Ninth Circuit) is no worse off after
restructuring, and the non-California circuit (the Twelfth Circuit) is better off,
that would seem to effect an overall improvement.
10

The most recent recommendation was issued on March 14, 2017. See
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2017_judicial_conference_judgeship_recommendatio
ns_0.pdf. For further discussion of this point, see Part II.
11

For further discussion of the California portion of the caseload, see Part II.
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Creating a Twelfth Circuit from some of the states that are now part of the
Ninth Circuit could indeed appear attractive to the judges and lawyers of those
states. No one thinks that it is really desirable to have a system in which cases
are decided by panels of three judges selected at random from an array of more
than 40 active and senior circuit judges (as well as judges from other courts
sitting by designation). That arrangement may be inevitable for the circuit that
includes California, but in the new Twelfth Circuit the cohort of judges would be
much smaller. In addition, judges might not have to travel as much for oral
argument (although that would depend in part on the particular configuration),
and the Judicial Conference of the Circuit could be open to all members of the
circuit bar, as it is in other circuits.
What prompts this suggestion is my view that although the arguments made
by proponents of a circuit split are not persuasive, the arguments made by
opponents are not very compelling either. For example, opponents emphasize
the value of having a single court interpret and apply federal law in the west. But
empirical studies – including interviews with lawyers – have shown that conflicts
between circuits generally do not present a serious problem in the legal system.12
If the existing Ninth Circuit were to be split, some disagreements between the
new Ninth and the Twelfth Circuit on issues of federal law would no doubt
develop, but these would be no more troublesome than the disagreements that
sometimes arise today between the Ninth and other circuits. And with rare
exceptions those disagreements have minimal impact on counseling and
litigation.13 Most of the other arguments against circuit division can be addressed
through ameliorative provisions in the legislation; some of these are discussed in
Part II.
How might the approach suggested here be implemented? I turn now to the
considerations that should guide Congress in carving out a new Twelfth Circuit
composed of some states that are part of the present Ninth Circuit.

12

See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693 (1995) (reporting on study conducted for Federal
Judicial Center); Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective
of Time and Experience, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 247 (1999) (reporting on lawyer interviews).
13

“When one considers both the tolerability of the unresolved conflicts and their
persistence, the evidence points strongly to the conclusion that unresolved intercircuit conflicts
do not constitute a problem of serious magnitude in the federal judicial system today.” Arthur
D. Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 81, 89-90 (2001).
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II. If Restructuring Is Desirable,
How Should the Legislation Be Drafted?
On the evidence now available, I do not think the proponents have made
the case that the Ninth Circuit is too large to function effectively. But Congress
may conclude that restructuring would be beneficial, particularly if, as discussed
above, Congress looks separately at the likely consequences for each of the two
new circuits. On that premise, I suggest six precepts that should guide the
Subcommittee in drafting circuit division legislation. For convenience, I will refer
to the circuit that includes California as the “new Ninth Circuit” and to the other
circuit as the Twelfth Circuit. Included here are a number of detailed suggestions
that respond to concerns expressed about prior circuit division proposals.
1. Each of the new circuits should be composed of at least three states.
A federal judicial circuit should be composed of at least three states. This is
not an idea that is based on academic speculation; on the contrary, it was the
conclusion of the very practical-minded White Commission – a commission
created by Congress, with four judges (one a judge of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals) and a former president of the American Bar Association as its members.
The Commission cogently explained the reasons for its position:
Circuit realignment to produce circuits smaller than three states is
undesirable. We conclude this because we believe three is the minimum
necessary for units of the intermediate tier of a federal system to serve
an appropriate federalizing function. Appellate courts serve this function
better when they comprise judges from several states. This not only
ensures a broader, more national perspective essential to a federal court
system, but enlists the continuing interest of several congressional
delegations and spreads among a larger number of senators the informal
but ingrained influence over the appointment of the court’s judges.
Concentrating such influence in one or two senators over a court with
appellate caseloads as large as those generated, for example, by
California, New York, or Texas, would not be, in our view, wise policy.14
Those who disagree with this conclusion point out that California is a
populous and diverse state. So it is. But that is not responsive to the rationale
articulated by the White Commission. As the Commission noted, having three
states in a circuit “spreads among a larger number of senators the informal but
ingrained influence over the appointment of the court’s judges.” Each senator
14

White Commission Report, supra note 2, at 52-53.
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brings a unique outlook and a different set of priorities, thus helping to ensure “a
broader, more national perspective essential to a federal court system.” No
matter how diverse California might be, the state still has only two senators.
The political dynamics affecting federal judicial appointments will change
from time to time, depending on which party controls the White House and who
sits in the Senate. But with three states, each of which has one or more seats on
the court of appeals, we can expect greater diversity of jurisprudential
perspectives than if only one or two states were represented. Moreover, each
senator is, at least potentially, a voice for the circuit when political disagreement
threatens a prolonged period of vacant judgeships or other injury to the circuit’s
ability to function effectively.15
Those who question the three-state minimum often cite the District of
Columbia Circuit, which encompasses a small geographical area and a single
federal judicial district. But the existence of the District of Columbia Circuit in no
way refutes the argument. First, the District of Columbia has no senators. The
President – elected by a national constituency – exercises complete control over
nominations to the court of appeals. No senator enjoys a right to be consulted,
let alone a right to veto, in appointments and other matters affecting the circuit.
Second, the President can and does appoint judges from anywhere in the country.
The District of Columbia Circuit is thus a national court even though its
geographical jurisdiction encompasses only a single small district.
Thus, the White Commission was correct: “Circuit realignment to produce
circuits smaller than three states is undesirable.” The arguments advanced against
adhering to the three-state minimum do not withstand scrutiny. If Congress
restructures the Ninth Circuit, it should do so in a way that does not produce
any circuit smaller than three states.

15

This is not simply a matter of theory. During the George W. Bush administration, there
were four long-standing Michigan vacancies on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals because the
Michigan Senators blocked all of the President’s nominees from that state. But four nominees
from other states were confirmed to the court. In the Fourth Circuit, another disagreement
between the White House and Senators kept North Carolina from having any active judges on
the court of appeals from 1999 through July 2003.
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2. To bring justice “closer to the people,” Congress should restructure the
circuit in a way that respects the relationships and arrangements that the people
of the nine states in the circuit have developed voluntarily over the years.
If the new Ninth Circuit should be composed of California and at least two
other states, which states should they be? To answer that question, it is helpful to
consider the theme of this hearing: “bringing justice closer to the people.”
The idea of bringing justice “closer to the people” is an appealing one, but it
is not entirely clear what it might mean in the era of the Internet and electronic
communication. I think that in the context of circuit restructuring, bringing justice
closer to the people should mean respecting the relationships and arrangements
that the people of the circuit have developed voluntarily over the years. From
this perspective, a central question is: where should Arizona be placed? When
the White Commission held its hearings in 1998, several Arizona lawyers and
judges discussed this issue. All took the same position: Arizona belongs in the
same circuit as California. A few years later, I did some research on legal and
commercial practice in Arizona; I found that the state’s closest ties are with
California and, to a lesser degree, with Nevada.
Based on the White Commission hearings and my own research, I would
conclude that California belongs with Arizona and Nevada. But the Subcommittee
will want current information; it can obtain that information from the judges and
lawyers of the affected states.
Unfortunately, Arizona is the second-largest source of appeals to the Ninth
Circuit from the district courts; Nevada is fourth (with Washington State third by
a small margin). Thus the most attractive configuration from the perspective of
preserving existing relationships is problematic from the perspective of caseload
allocation.
In the 114th Congress, a new proposed configuration emerged for the first
time in many years: a Pacific Coast circuit composed of California, Oregon,
Washington, and Hawaii.16 Those four states could well be regarded as sharing a
community of interest. As for the proposed Twelfth Circuit, here too Congress
would want to hear from the lawyers and judges in the affected states.

16

The circuit would also have included Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. In the
remainder of this statement, I will assume that these Territories – which of course do not have
Senators – will be included in the circuit of which Hawaii is a part.

March 20, 2017

Hellman – Ninth Circuit – Page 13

3. The legislation should allocate to the new Ninth Circuit a sufficient
number of judgeships to assure that the per-judge caseload in that circuit would
be no greater than it is today, and preferably smaller.
In the past, circuit division legislation has been opposed with virtual
unanimity by the legal community in California and by California political figures
on both sides of the aisle. One reason for that opposition has been that the
legislation almost invariably short-changed the proposed new Ninth Circuit in the
number of appellate judgeships allocated to it. New proposals should avoid that
defect, which disserves the people as well as the legal community of the affected
states.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to get information about the proportion of the
court of appeals caseload contributed by each of the states within the circuit.
Both the Ninth Circuit’s annual report and the statistical reports of the
Administrative Office of United States Courts break out the district court appeals
by district. But they do not provide that information for the administrative
appeals and the original proceedings. For the year ended Sept. 30, 2015 (the most
recent available), the latter two categories accounted for about 40% of the total
caseload.
The vast majority of the administrative agency cases were immigration
appeals. It is likely that the immigration appeals were concentrated in California;
to the extent that they were, the figures on district court appeals would
understate the proportion of the total caseload that comes from California.
Indeed, a very preliminary examination of a sampling of immigration appeals
within the present Ninth Circuit indicates that as many as two-thirds are likely to
derive from California.
Presumably more precise information about the geographic source of
administrative appeals is available from the Ninth Circuit Clerk’s Office. With
that information, it should be possible to determine how judgeships should be
allocated between the new Ninth Circuit and the Twelfth Circuit in a way that is
fair to both.
As mentioned in Part I, the Judicial Conference of the United States has
recommended five new permanent judgeships for the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.17 It would be desirable for Congress to create these judgeships as part

17

See supra note 10.
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of the circuit division legislation and, depending on the precise restructuring, to
allocate most or even all of them to the new Ninth Circuit.
In addition, Congress can make it easy for judges on each of the new courts
of appeals to sit in the other circuit without having to go through the regular
statutory process of seeking designation by the Chief Justice of the United States.
(See 28 U.S.C. § 291.) All that should be necessary is designation by the chief
judge of the circuit in which the judge ordinarily sits. A provision to that effect is
already included in one of the pending circuit reorganization bills (H.R. 196).
Finally, the legislation should specify that the circuit will not actually be
divided until at least some of the new judgeships created by the bill have been
filled. Such a provision would assure that the new Ninth Circuit would not be left
short-handed during the nomination and confirmation process for the new
judges. Language to accomplish this purpose can be found in H.R. 196 (section
15).
4. The legislation should allow the two new circuits to take advantage of the
economies of scale that the present large circuit now enjoys in its administrative
and managerial functions.
Ninth Circuit judges testifying in opposition to previous circuit split
proposals have emphasized considerations of cost and efficiency. In particular, the
judges have pointed to the economies of scale that the circuit now enjoys in
administrative and managerial functions. For example, Judge (now Chief Judge)
Sidney Thomas noted that the resources of a central staff “are available to
manage courthouse construction, assist in information technology, provide aid in
personnel management, and help in capital case management.”18 In a similar vein,
then-Chief Judge Schroeder observed that the new circuit would have to
replicate functions such as “processing complaints against judges, ascertaining
budgetary requirements for the courts … and meeting [heightened security
requirements].”19
This concern can be met by including a provision – already part of H.R. 196
– that would authorize any two contiguous circuits to jointly carry out
administrative functions and activities when the circuit councils of the two
circuits determine that these functions will benefit from coordination or
18

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 2001: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Comm. at
63 (2002) (statement of Judge Thomas) [hereinafter House Hearing].
19

Id. at 11 (statement of Chief Judge Schroeder).

March 20, 2017

Hellman – Ninth Circuit – Page 15

consolidation. Thus, if it is efficient to have a single person or office handle
matters like courthouse construction or information technology or security for
both of the new western circuits, there will be no need to forgo that efficiency.
There is precedent for this kind of intercircuit coordination; the statute
governing bankruptcy appeals allows “the judicial councils of 2 or more circuits”
to establish “a joint bankruptcy appellate panel” for the participating circuits. See
28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4). That statute requires authorization by the Judicial
Conference of the United States, but it is unnecessary to include such a
requirement in the circuit division legislation.
5. The legislation should make easy to send judges from both circuits into
districts experiencing a temporary judicial need, whether in the Twelfth or New
Ninth Circuit.
At a hearing on a circuit division bill in 2002, Ninth Circuit judges expressed
concern that splitting the circuit would impair the ability of courts within the
circuit “to lend judges to those districts suffering temporary judicial need.”20 To
address this concern, the legislation should authorize each of the new circuits to
designate judges for service in the other circuit without having to seek
authorization from the Chief Justice of the United States, as current law would
require. There should be provisions applicable to circuit judges as well as district
judges.
This would not quite replicate the current arrangement; two approvals
would be required instead of one. But if we assume, as I do, that the two circuits
would do their best to make the system work, the argument loses much of its
force. Again, provisions along these lines are already included in H.R. 196.
6. Congress should assume that Twelfth Circuit, following the example of the
Eleventh Circuit upon its creation, will adopt as binding precedent the decisions
handed down by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals before the reorganization.
Immediately after Congress divided the old Fifth Circuit into two new
circuits, the Eleventh Circuit convened en banc “to consider what case law will
serve as the established precedent of the Eleventh Circuit at the time it comes
into existence.” In Bonner v. City of Pritchard,21 the court held unanimously that
decisions of the old Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on
the date preceding the split “shall be binding as precedent in the Eleventh Circuit,
20

House Hearing, supra note 18, at 63 (statement of Judge Thomas).

21

661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
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for this court, the district courts, and the bankruptcy courts in the circuit.” The
court noted that any such decisions could be overruled by the Eleventh Circuit
sitting en banc.
This was the sensible course of action, for reasons eloquently explained by
Chief Judge John C. Godbold on behalf of the court. The full opinion is worth
reading, but here are some excerpts:
Stability and predictability are essential factors in the proper
operation of the rule of law. … During [an extensive span of time
starting in 1866] the decisions of the Fifth Circuit have been precedents
applied in the states that now constitute the Eleventh Circuit. … Citizens
of these states and their legal advisers have relied upon [this
jurisprudence] and structured their legal relationships with one another
and conducted their affairs in accordance with it. By adopting the former
Fifth Circuit precedent we maintain the stability and predictability
previously enjoyed.
The court noted that this resolution was consistent with the approach followed
after the one previous division of a circuit: decisions by district courts in the new
Tenth Circuit “accepted the law of the Eighth as binding.”
Until recently, there would have been no need to even mention this point.
But a circuit division bill introduced in the Senate early this year (S. 276) includes
a provision stating: “Precedent from the former ninth circuit shall not be binding
on the twelfth circuit. Precedent from any circuit, including the former and new
ninth circuits, shall be persuasive authority only.”
There may well be an argument that a provision such as this is
unconstitutional under principles of separation of powers. But whether or not
such a law is constitutional, it would be extremely unwise. As Chief Judge
Godbold explained, citizens and lawyers have relied on circuit precedent in all of
the vast areas of human activity governed by federal law. To abrogate that
precedent and allow every question to be litigated afresh would be
extraordinarily disruptive – and also costly, not just to the courts but also to
lawyers and their clients.22
22

In his lecture on “Adherence to Precedent,” Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo famously
observed that “the labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past
decision could be reopened in every case.” Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
149 (1921). Under S. 276, the additional labor would also be required of lawyers, driving up the
cost of legal services.
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There is no need to say anything about precedent in the legislation;
Congress should assume that the new Twelfth Circuit would follow the example
of the Eleventh and convene en banc to adopt a counterpart to the rule of Bonner
v. City of Pritchard.
III. How Do Pending Bills Measure Up?
At this writing, two bills to reorganize the Ninth Circuit have been
introduced in the House: H.R. 196, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judgeship
and Reorganization Act of 2017, introduced by Rep. Simpson; and H.R. 250, the
Judicial Administration and Improvement Act of 2016, introduced by Rep. Biggs
and other members of the Arizona delegation.
H.R. 196 would create a new Ninth Circuit composed of only two states,
California and Hawaii. As explained by the White Commission, “three [states] is
the minimum necessary for units of the intermediate tier of a federal system to
serve an appropriate federalizing function.” The reorganization proposed by H.R.
196 is inconsistent with that principle. Moreover, the proposed California-Hawaii
court of appeals would be so overwhelmingly dominated by California judges that
it would be, in effect, a one-state circuit court – the ultimate negation of the
“federalizing function” described by the White Commission.
In other respects, however, H.R. 196 deserves plaudits. Indeed, it is evident
that the bill was crafted with the aim of addressing the concerns raised by Ninth
Circuit judges about previous circuit split legislation. There are good provisions
on temporary assignments of judges between the new Ninth and the Twelfth
Circuit (sections 11 and 12) and also a good provision on administrative
coordination (section 13).
More important, H.R. 196 also has a provision (section 4) authorizing seven
new judgeships, five permanent and two temporary, all for the new Ninth Circuit.
Four of the new judgeships – two permanent and two temporary – could be filled
immediately upon enactment of the bill. The other three judgeships could not be
filled until January 21, 2018.23 Further, the split would not take place until five of
the new judgeships authorized by the bill had been filled (section 15).
The other bill, H.R. 250, would create a new Ninth Circuit composed of
four states – California, Oregon, Washington, and Hawaii. This is the “Pacific
Coast Circuit” discussed above, and it would certainly satisfy the White
23

It is not clear why appointment of three of the new judges would be delayed until that
particular date.
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Commission’s three-state rule. But in other respects H.R. 250 is wanting. It does
not have the provisions on temporary assignments between circuits and
administrative coordination that are included in H.R. 196. And, unlike H.R. 196, it
would not create any permanent judgeships.24
Based on this analysis, I think it would be efficient for the Subcommittee to
take H.R. 196 as the starting-point for a new bill. However, section 3 of H.R. 196
would be replaced by section 3 of H.R. 250, so that the new Ninth Circuit would
consist of California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern
Mariana Islands; the remaining states of the current Ninth Circuit would be
moved into the Twelfth Circuit.
The most important remaining question relates to the allocation of judges
between the two new circuits. Under the composite bill discussed in the
preceding paragraph, the two circuits together would have 34 judgeships.
Currently, the states and Territories of the new Ninth Circuit account for about
75% of the district court appeals. On that basis, the new Ninth Circuit would be
entitled to 26 of the 34 judges. If the two temporary judgeships are also allocated
to the new Ninth Circuit, that would probably take care of the additional
immigration caseload, at least in the immediate future.25 The other 8 judgeships
would be allocated to the five states of the Twelfth. That happens to be exactly
the number of active judges who now have their duty stations in the states of the
proposed Twelfth.
IV. Conclusion
If the Ninth Circuit did not exist in its present configuration, no one would
argue that Congress should create a single circuit to handle one-fifth of the
nation’s federal appellate caseload. But that is not the issue for Congress or this
Subcommittee today. The Ninth Circuit is a going concern, and the vast majority
of its appellate judges believe that it is working well. The primary consumers of
24

It does have a provision (section 8) for temporary judgeships in the Twelfth Circuit to
replace judges whose duty stations are now in a Twelfth Circuit state but who elect to be
permanently assigned to the new Ninth Circuit.
25

One of the most useful steps Congress could take to ease the caseload burdens of the
federal courts of appeals (particularly in the Ninth and Second Circuits) would be to create a
robust system of review by an Article I court of immigration decisions by administrative law
judges. Such a measure would also be beneficial to the immigration system. Another
subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, the Subcommittee on Immigration and Border
Security, is already pursuing this idea. See http://naij-usa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Gowdy-Lofgren-Letter-for-GAO-EOIR-Study1.12.15.pdf.
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the circuit’s appellate decisions – trial judges, lawyers, and the business
community – have not complained that the circuit is malfunctioning; on the
contrary, at least in the past, they have strongly opposed the various proposals
for circuit reorganization. Under these circumstances, it is hard to see why
Congress should proceed with any kind of restructuring.
But if Congress looks separately at the interests of the two circuits that
would be created by a split, it may conclude that division would improve the
administration of justice in the states of the proposed new non-California circuit
– and that the reorganization can be accomplished without disadvantaging the
other states. If Congress acts upon that conclusion, the legislation should be
carefully drafted to avoid the flaws that made prior proposals so injurious,
particularly to the circuit that would include California. In particular, each of the
new circuits should be composed of at least three states. The legislation should
allocate to the new Ninth Circuit a sufficient number of judgeships to assure that
the per-judge caseload in that circuit would be no greater than it is today, and
preferably smaller. And provisions should be included that will enable the two
circuits to take advantage of the economies of scale that the present large circuit
now enjoys in its administrative and managerial functions and in the lending of
judges to districts in need.
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